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Abstract. This paper presents a new concept as a spe-
cial type of virtualization of particular event based com-
munication components in RFID ecosystems. The new
approach is containers based virtualization, and it is
applied and tested on the container of Object name
service. The results of the experiment allowed us to
do the preliminary analysis of security consequences
on the isolated containerized DNS-based RFID sub-
service. We confirmed feasibility with this sandboxing
technology represented by the special container. They
bring the benefits in terms of efficient software com-
ponent life-cycle management and integrity improve-
ments. Experiments results of the containerization
are discussed to show the possible isolation ways of
other components like EPCis and middleware. There
is present evaluation towards external threats and vul-
nerabilities. The result is a higher level of integrity,
availability of whole ecosystem and resiliency against
external threats. This gives a new opportunity to build
robust RFID as Platform as a service, and it proves the
ability to achieve a positive impact on the end to end
service Quality of service.
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1. Introduction
Before we faced the era of virtualization and container-
ization, as proposed in [1], developers and adminis-
trators have had the only possibility to develop and
maintain components of any software based ecosystem
on premises or within data-centres. All those installa-
tions required physical hardware to be designed, sized,
shipped, tested, operated and maintained. Software
operated on it required a similar approach. The usual
life-cycle management consists of many phases like
building, configuration, versions, shipping, deployment
and running of applications and services discussed in
[2] and we know it brings a lot of follow up problems.
Same principles are valid for a general software solution
in Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) ecosystems.
To solve it there are proposals for the modern RFID
application development to move upper described pro-
cess towards Platform as a Service (PaaS) direction, as
proposed in [3]. We realized there is necessary to allow
the creation of utilization models, which help to align
systems to new multi-tenant RFID environment with
all in previous researched summarized benefits possibly
achieved by the virtualization.
Nowadays more and more projects are being stressed
to shorten the time from design, through delivery up
to hand-over to the operations. RFID ecosystems can
be considered as platforms of basic and complementary,
well-known components. Tagged objects are basic com-
ponents, which are read by readers via radio based en-
vironment. Each read consists of several events, which
belong to accordingly mapped and processes record
within systems like RFID middleware. RFID middle-
ware, complex events based units, are responsible for
the processing as well as for granting appropriate level
of quality how proposed in [4] and [5].
Each and every RFID ecosystem usually consist of
complementary processing components like: secured
network infrastructure, object name service (ONS),
middlewares, databases and certification authorities, as
researched in the architecture published in [6] with its
cloud variant.
Containerization problems as briefly introduced in
[7] we enhanced, researched and analyzed can be con-
sidered as a new, specific way towards PaaS. It is cru-
cial to emphasize that there exist system components
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Fig. 1: Configure, build, ship and operate flows.
of RFID ecosystem, which are not suitable or not rec-
ommended to be containerized from different reasons
or by their nature, even though there could be fore-
seen benefits from cloud perspective. Those reasons
could be dependencies to physical hardware like USB,
Ethernet or other peripherals. Followed by a system,
which requires extremely low latency operations up to
fulfilling extreme performance demand and finally by
a system which by design does not support a mission
critical applications which were not secured for virtu-
alization.
Other reasons preventing containerization are a local
presence and physical and logical security limitations.
For the feasibility targeted experiment, we had chosen
those which are capable of being containerized as mid-
dleware and ONS. These components were suitable for
our tests. We applied containerization methods, and
it is important to mention that sand-boxing is more
about the secure execution of untrusted code [8] while
containerization is about secure execute of trusted ap-
plications as depicted in Fig. 1.
Although containerization is the new virtualization
as presented in [9] we decided to build this experiments
based on Docker which allowed us to do sand-boxing
(focus on integrity), and by containerizing (focus on
build, ship, run everywhere and anytime). We had
chosen containerization over pure virtualization with
Docker technology mainly, supported by research in
[10] to uncover the performance impact and get better
insights into QoS.
Technological principle of Docker isolates applica-
tions by packing them with their dependencies, config-
uration files, libraries, interfaces into one consistent im-
age based environment like atomic unit, called contain-
ers according to [11]. Those containers can be seam-
lessly moved between hosts or within cloud providers
and we combined different approaches to prove com-
petitiveness with equipped.
The rest of the article focuses on the analysis. A
study is conducted by experiments which were com-
piled based of two problem questions. As first we stud-
ied if it is possible to incorporate containerization into
RFID ecosystems. Secondly we analysed what will be
the level of overhead/impact in case we focus on achiev-
ing higher level of security by application containeriza-
tion.
2. Methods of
Containerization
Docker as the chosen containerization technology heav-
ily relies on two components of Linux kernel like
Cgroups andNamespaces. Other components could
be combination of SElinux, AppArmor, Netlin, Netfil-
ter, lxc, libcontainer and libvirt development libraries.
The environment was recently extended with execu-
tion driver API, very similar in principle to the one
which is used in software defined networks. Execu-
tion environment is surrounding each virtualized con-
tainer. Docker engine replaces hypervisor and guest OS
in case of common containerization as visible in Fig. 2,
where we introduced RFID components into this con-
cept. Each container is combination of Cgroups and
Namespaces. Namespaces and the Cgroups are capable
to be combined to build final container configuration.
Cgroup is the way to combine and isolate resources
like processes into process trees groups. It helps to dif-
ferentiate which processes belong to which container.
The main security feature here is that same processes
in different process trees cannot see, interact, influence,
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Fig. 2: RFID containerized layered architecture.
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and threaten the others. It is even possible to encapsu-
late main process INIT which is in charge of all other
subprocesses. Cgroups like major components are re-
sponsible for management of subprocesses to get the
resources which were allocated available on time and
within required configuration.
Cgroups allow controllers: a) to limit cpu - split
not according percentage but according the predefined
units, which are supposed to quantify fragment of cpu
time the same is valid for the memory allocation, b) to
provide cpuset - example: 4 cores, it is not possible to
provide 1.25 of core, and c) to limit block devices in-
put/output performance by blkio to limit virtual drives
access, write, read, input/output operations.
We performed set of feasibility tests in two different
set-ups with virtual NAT; option for container to run is
docker run -P portIN:portOUT and with na-
tive network TCP/IP stack; option for container is
docker run -net=host. Usual Docker based con-
tainer with network stack brings a slight decrease of
network performance measurable already on by sim-
ple ICMP ping tools towards system gateway: Na-
tive: 1000 packets transmitted, 1000 received, packet
loss 0 %, time 9008 ms. rtt min /avg/max /mdev =
0.542/0.703/0.912/0.094 ms. Containerized: 1000
packets transmitted, 1000 packets received, packet
loss 0 %, round-trip min /avg/max /stddev =
0.704/0.833/1.103/0.134 ms.
Namespaces provide the most straightforward way
of isolation. By this we achieve behaviour when one
process cannot see neighbour or parent processes. Ex-
amples of namespaces are: mnt - mount, particular
container, can see only root fs, not devices mounted
by the underlying system, UTS - Unix time sharing
namespace, PID namespace – assures INIT not capable
without PID 1 and user namespace - root in container
is not root high privilege admin account on hardware
node.
For all the experiments we relied on Docker engine
version 1.6.0. The principle is to bring all necessary
entities (files, objects, services, stacks) into an isolated
environment presented like sandbox or container. We
let the external broker entity, in our case it will be
Docker engine, to manage and operate separated appli-
cations domains for each RFID component. Separation
of resources dictates to objects and subjects to achieve
certain predefined functionality and security goals.
2.1. Mobile Middleware
As the first application to containerization, we have
chosen, is RFID mobile middleware called LLRP.droid
which was developed recently on our department.
Mobile application was assessed and assured ability
to be containerized by following industry best prac-
tices. To be able to make LLRP.droid container-
ized, there was created an application image. To
build an image, it is necessary to create Dockerfile
prior and put it into the root of a project direc-
tory. Inside Dockerfile there is a mandatory field
with the base image details. Then we built the con-
tainerized application LLRP.droid by the command:
docker build -t <android.LLRP.droid>.
In details we followed this process:
• installed prerequisites, tools and libraries,
• installed Android SDK development environment
and its update,
• set SDK environment variables,
• prepared WORKDIR for Android (assets, bin,
gen, libs, res, src),
• copied Android application over into the Docker
container for compilation,
• built the Android application within the Docker
container.
2.2. Containerized Object Name
Service
Another RFID component after middleware and sup-
posed to be containerized/tested was the Object name
service (ONS) as described in GS1 standard [12]. ONS
is one of the key heterogeneous RFID ecosystems com-
ponents. In our experiment the ONS is a combination
of Knot 2.0 DNS, which is responsible for a name au-
thority pointer (NAPTR) responses. DNS design spec-
ification and recommendation for containerization are
available in [13]. Knot Domain name service (DNS) is
an authoritative DNS server which supports key fea-
tures of the domain name system including DNSSEC.
Containerized DNS daemon is in interaction with
containerized Nginx implementation (responsible to
route client via http protocol within NAPTR response)
of Electronic product code information system (EP-
Cis). EPCis is web based information system for
RFID/IoT ecosystems.
Table 1 shows a comparison of response time of ONS
running in native and containerized environment.
Tab. 1: ONS responsiveness.
Load
time [s]
First
byte [s]
Speed
index
Native
first 0.498 0.463 594
repeated 0.07 0.317 71
Container
first 0.546 0.481 696
repeated 0.138 0.307 140
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CONTAINER IMAGE COMMAND
789cbdbd0dd4 lk/ONS “knotd”
CREATED STATUS NAMES
2min ago Up 2min stoic_payne
CONTAINER IMAGE COMMAND
8ba00375bbb4 lk/ONS-resolver “kresolved”
CREATED STATUS NAMES
2min ago Up 2min focused_carson
Fig. 3: Containerized DNS components of ONS service.
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Fig. 4: EPCis responses.
In the Fig. 3 you can see DNS components running
containerized service on the target platform.
Figure 4 depicts a graphical representation of re-
sponse time visualization over count of 200 requests/re-
sponses processed by combined native and container-
ized EPCis service. We can see very little difference in
latencies which could mean minimum network perfor-
mance negative impact.
Figure 5 shows the main impact by the container-
ization brought by DNS container, one component of
whole ONS solution. Native DNS responses are with-
out major deviations, although the containerized DNS
show the performance decrease. NAPTR query count
was set to 50.
Benchmarking utilities used for measuring web
server performance are: httperf and ab suites:
httperf -server native/container -port
80 -uri /page.html -rate 150 -num-conn
10000 -num-call 1
ab -kc 20 -t 60 http://server
native/container /page.html.
Containerized EPCis is operated by:
docker run -d -p 80:80 ngingx epcis.
Containerized ONS is operated by:
docker run -p 53:53 knot knotd.
3. Benefits
Containers main benefits are:
• speed - container can start in less than one second,
development and deployment time is shortened to
minimum,
• consistency and integrity - each container encap-
sulates only those components which are needed
and protect them from altering, it minimizes risk
of bug and malicious code,
• density and resource efficiency - minimizing of en-
vironment allows focus on resource efficiency),
• flexibility in delivery and operations - portabil-
ity achieved by container pull approach instead of
huge complex installation processes.
4. Security Impacts
Based on the previous experiments we can do par-
ticular conclusion describing the security impact of
tested technology. Each Docker-based container can be
equipped with measures which will prevent to launch
unsigned (assured integrity) software content. The en-
vironment is protected and isolated as the whole unit.
There is a minimum set of interfaces towards out-
side world of the underlying Docker engine and operat-
ing system. We can achieve prevention of the attacks
as discussed in [14] by its combination with SElinux
and AppArmor. Containers do not prevent to use ad-
vanced comprehensive authentication techniques which
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Fig. 5: ONS responses.
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is the advantage for future enhancement with certifica-
tion authority functionalities. By the containerization
we do not lose contextual awareness of security and
privacy in RFID systems how it is described in [15].
Research communities share a plenty of security is-
sues and problems which are being continuously ad-
dressed by developers of containerized technologies like
Docker although the RFID implementation is very spe-
cific and we had to consider security aspects during
re-design and proposals of feasibility tests.
By simple mistakes there could be compromised sys-
tems or data processed by any component of RFID
system. The execution development API offers many
advantages and introduced tools like chroot and jails
which bring higher level of security, but were not uti-
lized here.
To use cryptography, we should always consider pos-
sible entropy problem inside containers. Others are the
problems regarding logging and monitoring due to iso-
lation limitations. In general containers helps to pre-
vent and secure against:
• denial of service attacks,
• privilege escalations in and out of containers,
• not authorized integrity changes,
• processed data leakages.
Container adds layer based security, blocks intention
to get out of the container, and increases privileges
safety inside the container. Containers/layer are new
barriers which the attacker has to overcome. Images we
were pulling from the registry have been verified with
hash algorithm processed on both ends of the commu-
nication channel with used digest of SHA256.
5. Future Work
The future work should be split into two parts. The
first part will be focused on the unification of container-
ization method of on-premises approach based software
solution components, plus identification of other con-
tainerization capable RFID ecosystem components.
Second part is supposed to tune the way of simu-
lation containerized virtualization with focus on im-
provement of measurable performance indicators.
With this knowledge and experience based on this
proof of concept to build whole RFID ecosystem and
get it ready for future built, ship and operate quick
approach. This approach enables efficient testing and
rapid system development. We proved that these ex-
periments are doable to be followed up with respecting
best practices and described limitations.
6. Conclusion
We presented this feasibility study, where we did an
assessment of proposed approach of containerization of
usual RFID components. This feasibility study con-
sisted of an evaluation of impact plus analysis, and it
delivers confirmation as the results of a correspondence
with proposed initially described problems.
Our impact analysis included these steps: prepara-
tion and identification of main impact areas like enu-
meration as impact on event processing efficiency, se-
curity (availability, confidentiality and data/records in-
tegrity), assessment and evaluation impact.
First question was fulfilled by the feasibility study
extended with detailed description of realization. Sec-
ond one was covered by the impact analysis, with result
as a proof that containerization has no serious negative
efficiency, negative performance and negative security
impact.
Containerization is opening new space for advanced
threat analytic to be implemented into heterogeneous
containerized ecosystems.
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